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RECENT DECISIONS
Sales: Cash Sale Doctrine vs. Voidable Title Doctrine: The "cash
sale" doctrine states that when the sale of goods is for cash, and a check
in lieu of cash is accepted in payment for the goods sold, the title to
the goods does not pass to the buyer until such time as the check is
honored. The "voidable title" doctrine, in a similar check situation,
holds that the buyer receives a voidable title to the goods, which title
cannot be avoided once the check is honored. A judicial question occurs
in the application of these two doctrines when an innocent third party
purchases the goods from the original vendee in the time interval between the original seller's acceptance of the check and a later dishonoring of the check by the bank. The result of a judicial application of
either of these two doctrines in a three party transaction has been the
subject matter of numerous law review commentaries and texts, and
has been annotated in detail.1 Additional consideration is now given to
this subject in light of the position which the Uniform Commercial Code
has adopted.
In Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,2 a Minnesota
case, the petitioner, a grain elevator company, sold and delivered the
physical possession of a quantity of corn to a licensed grain dealer in
return for a personal check. This dealer-vendee in turn sold the corn
to the defendant. The dealer-vendee's check was dishonored due to
insufficient funds, and the petitioner was allowed to recover from the
defendant the value of the corn less an amount previously recovered on
a dealer's bond.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in affirming the decision, stated that
in this state it is well settled that, where a cash sale of goods
is intended and a check in payment thereof is accepted, there is
an implied representation that the check will be paid upon
presentation at the bank upon which it is drawn; and that if not so
paid title to the goods will remain in the seller who may recover
the goods or their value from a third party who has purchased
them from the seller's vendee.3
In a "voidable title" state the seller may avoid the sale and recover
the goods as against the vendee who has issued a worthless check, but
has no rights against a subsequent buyer who purchases the goods from
the original buyer before the original seller has acted to avoid the sale.4
Thus, in the Wisconsin case of Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ponce,
where an out-of-state auto dealer delivered an automobile into the
vendee's possession on a conditional sales contract in return for a
1 Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless
VAND. L. REv. 55 nn. 1-3 (1956).

Checks and The Bona Fide Purchaser, 10

130 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1964).
3 Id. at 73.
4 17 Wis.2d 281, 116 N.W.2d 252 (1962).
2
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worthless check, the original seller could not recover from a subsequent purchaser since the seller had not acted to avoid the sale before
the third party innocently purchased the automobile. In confirming
Wisconsin's adherence to the "voidable title" doctrine, the court stated
that "if the check is worthless, the seller has ordinarily been induced
to act by fraud. The fraudulent buyer has a voidable title which becomes
indefeasible upon a bona fide purchase for value from the fraudulent
buyer." 5
A court, in determining the merits of either the "cash sale" or the
"voidable title" doctrine, must make a policy decision on a matter of
business convenience.
Proponents of both the positions of the initial vendor and the
bona fide purchaser allege that in traisactions involving worthless checks their position will do more to encourage the free flow
of trade. Those favoring the cash sale concept claim that if the
risk of a worthless check were placed upon the original seller he
would be reluctant to accept checks and would insist upon cash
payment, thereby inconveniencing both buyer and seller in valid
transfers. In contrast, Williston suggests that the application of
the voidable title concept encourages a non-restrictive movement
of goods in commerce. 6 (Footnotes omitted.)
Attention has been directed to those situations involving the transfer of bare possession in exchange for a worthless check. The Minnesota court, in recognizing that the "cash sale" doctrine was not applicable where possession-plus was given to the original vendee, stated
that
others have denied relief to the original seller as against a subsequent innocent purchaser from the seller's vendee, where the
latter possessed not only the physical possession of the goods
involved, but the indicia of title thereto as well; and where obviously questions of estoppel under the Uniform Sales Act were
involved. Of course where the question of estoppel based on
indicia of title or laches is involved, Minnesota is in accord with
these latter decisions. 7 (Footnotes omitted.)
The Uniform Commercial Code position, which is similar to the
"voidable title" doctrine and which takes into consideration the cash
aspects of all sales transactions, is as follows:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all the title which his
transferror had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser
of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the
interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When
DId. at 285, 116 N.W.2d at 255.
6
1

Corman, supra note 1, at 75.
Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., supra note 2, at 74. For a
complete discussion of indicia of title, laches, and equitable estoppel, see
Corman, supra note 1, at 62.
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goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the
purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the
purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is
later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash
sale.' ...

In the Guckeen case, the Minnesota court went on to say that their
adherence to the "cash sale" doctrine was in accordance with the majority of case law in the United States. On the other hand, the primary
objective of the Uniform Commercial Code is "uniformity in the laws
of the various states regulating commercial transactions." 9 The official
comment following the Code's "voidable title" section states that the
purpose of this particular section is "to gather together a series of
prior uniform statutory provisions and the case-law thereunder and
to state a unified and simplified policy on good faith purchase of
goods." 10 Thus, the "voidable title" section of the Code has been criticized as not bringing uniformity to the commercial field since it has
promulgated a minority doctrine and, if adopted, it would work many
reversals in the case-law area.
That such a criticism is valid seems rather doubtful. A majority
case-law trend is often predicated on the frequency of controversy
over a certain judicial doctrine. A review of the case-law under these
two doctrines indicates that the "cash sale" doctrine is more susceptible
to appellate court controversy; but it does not directly indicate that
the "cash sale" doctrine is followed, as such, in a majority of the states.
The statutory law of a majority of states conforms to the Code's
"voidable title" doctrine. Twenty-eight state legislatures, covering the
years 1953 to 1963, have officially enacted the Uniform Commercial
Code." The "voidable title" doctrine in these state codes is an exact reproduction of the doctrine as announced in the official text of the Uniform Commercial Code. Of these twenty-eight states, the Code is effective in twenty-four states as of the date of this article. In the reremaining four states, including Wisconsin, the effective date is 1965.12
The Uniform Commercial Code has, in its commercial paper section, further defined the rights of the original buyer to a "voidable title"
in a check situation by stating:
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403 [all references are to the 1962 Official
Text with Comments].

9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Report
10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403,

No. 1, at viii.
comment at 126.
1X Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
12 Wis. STAT. § 402.403 (1954), effective July 1, 1965, by Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 158.

1964-65]

RECENT DECISIONS

(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken
for an underlying obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer,
maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the underlying obligor;
and
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto
until the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand
until its presentment. If the instrument is dishonored
action may be maintained on either the instrument or
the obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on
13
the instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
In the field of conflicts between the "cash sale" and the "voidable
title" doctrines, the Uniform Commercial Code has adopted and clarified the "voidable title" doctrine. The Code has taken scrambled and
unreliable word formulas, and from these has promulgated several sections which should fit the needs of the commercial law dealing with
good faith purchasers for value and with questions arising between the
seller and buyer. The Code's desire to increase the marketability of
goods in the open market is readily apparent.
CHARLES
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Wills: Effect of Provision Designating Attorney for Executor:
In Estate of Sieben" the testator had designated both an executor and
an attorney for the executor. After admission of the will to probate and issuance of letters testamentary to the executor, the executor
having refused to retain the services of the named attorney, the latter
initiated the instant proceeding in the lower court by affidavit and order
to show cause why he should not be retained as attorney for the executor. The lower court upheld the designation and issued an order appointing the attorney, from which order the executor appealed. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that "in the
absence of a statement of intent in the will that a named attorney be
employed by the personal representative even at the cost of the resignation of the personal representative, an executor is not required to employ an attorney in opposition to the executor's own wishes."12 Although
the court did not uphold this testamentary designation of the attorney,
the implication of the language quoted above is that where there was an
adequate expression of an intention that the named attorney be retained
even at the cost of the resignation of the executor, the designation
would be upheld. 3
3

§ 3-802.
2id. at 170, 128 N.W. 2d at 445.

'1UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

124 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W. 2d 443 (1964).
3See

EcKHARDT, WORKBOOK FOR WIscoNsIN ESTATE PLANNERS § 3(D) (0.2)
(1961), for a suggested clause conditioning appointment of the executor on
his retaining the services of a designated attorney.

